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STUDENT MISCONDUCT AT PRIVATE
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES: A
ROADMAP FOR "FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS" IN DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS
Abstract: When called upon to review the disciplinary procedures of
private colleges and universities, courts have struggled to find a legal
theory upon which to base their reviews. Much of this struggle can be
attributed to the fact that, because the relationship between a student
and a university is unique, it is difficult to find an appropriate doctrinal
category. This Note analyzes the methods by which courts have reviewed
challenges to disciplinary proceedings in private colleges and
universities. Specifically, it examines the approaches taken by courts that
have reviewed private school disciplinary procedures, paying particular
attention to what these courts have recommended to avoid arbitrary
decisionmaking and to achieve "basic" or "fundamental" fairness.
INTRODUCTION
On February 25, 2000, the Columbia University Senate, a legisla-
tive body comprised of faculty, students and administrators, voted
unanimously to enact a new Sexual Misconduct Policy and Discipli-
nary Procedure and to create an "Office of Sexual Misconduct Pre-
vention and Education."' The campaign for the new policy was spear-
headed by Students Active for Ending Rape (SAFER), a campus group
committed to "a non-adversarial approach" to student discipline and
the eradication of "bureaucratic red tape" in the disciplinary process. 2
I See Resolutions of the Columbia University Senate, February 25, 2000, available at
hup://www.columbia.edu/cu/senate/resolutions/99.-00/TF022500.html  [hereinafter Res-
olutions] . The entire text of the Policy is available on the web page of the Office of Sexual
Misconduct Prevention and Education at http://wwwcolumbia,edu/cu/sexualiniscon-
duct/policy.hunl. Interestingly, the resolution permitted each of Columbia's undergradu-
ate and graduate schools to elect to participate in this new Discipline Procedure—only the
Law School elected not to participate and continues to govern student conduct in accor-
dance with a resolution adopted by the Faculty of Law on December 8, 1989, as amended
in June 1993 and on November 17, 1995. See University and Law School Regulations, available
at http://www.lawcolumbia.edu/academics/rules/University  Regulations.hunl.
2 See Jaime Sneider, It's A Brave 'New World at Columbia U., N.Y. POST, Oct. 6, 2000. The
campaign was also a response to federal and New York state law requirements that colleges
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The implementation of this new policy during the fall semester of the
2000-01 academic year touched off a firestorm of debate and re-
newed scrutiny of disciplinary systems in private colleges and universi-
ties across the nations
Critics of this policy argue that it suffers from a number of short-
comings. 4
 They maintain, for example, that the policy fails to afford a
student accused of sexual misconduct such fundamental tenets of due
process as the right to be present during testimony, to cross-examine
witnesses, to receive advance notice of evidence, to have an attorney
present during hearings, or to have a tape recording or a transcript of
the proceedings. 5
 Moreover, this failure to provide for a tape record-
ing or a transcript of the proceeding, critics argue, is likely to render
any appeal illusory. 6
 They further contend that the policy improperly
omits the assignment of a burden and fails to create any standard of
proof.? Critics also argue that the policy's skeletal framework of due
process is especially inadequate in situations in which the conduct in
question could subject the accused student to criminal prosecution
outside the university and where "conviction" within the university
may result in substantial social stigma as well as serious punishment
such as dismissa1. 8
 Additionally, the policy specifies that "breaches of
and universities promulgate policies and disciplinary procedures aimed at the prevention
of sex offenses. See generally Alan Stone, Vice President for Public Affairs, Columbia Univer-
sity, Letter to the Editor, Sexual Assault Policy Still Has Safeguards, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2000.
3 See Karen W. Arenson, New Procedure for Handling Sexual Misconduct Charges at Colum-
bia University is Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2000.
4
 See Vivian Berger, Sexual Misconduct Policy: No Due Process at CU, COLUMBIA SPECTATOR
(N.Y.), Nov. 21, 2000; Nat Hentoff, Columbia University's Star Chamber, VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y.),
Nov. 8, 2000; Dawn Santoli NYU Rejects Columbia-like Sexual Misconduct Policy, WASH. SQUARE
NEWS (N.Y.), Oct. 12, 2000; Sneider, supra note 2; Norah Vincent, The Accused, VILLAGE
VOICE (N.Y.), Oct. 25, 2000.
5 See Berger, supra note 4; Hentoff, supra note 4; Sneider, supra note 2; Santoli, supra
note 4; Vincent, supra note 4. One critic has also charged that the policy has substantive
shortcomings as well. See Berger, supra note 4. In particular, the policy defines sexual mis-
conduct as "non-consensual, intentional physical contact with a person's genitals, buttocks
or breasts" and goes on to state that "lack of consent may be inferred from the victim's
mental or physical incapacity or impairment of which the perpetrator was aware or should
have been aware." See Resolutions, supra note 1. These definitions, according to opponents,
are over-broad, lack clarity, and therefore do not adequately put students on notice as to
what conduct will be violative of the policy. See Berger, supra note 4. As a result, the policy
may in fact become a trap for the unwary innocent. See KORS ALAN CHARLES HARVEY A.
SILVERGLATE, THE SHADOW UNIVERSITY 268 (1998). A thorough discussion of the criti-
cisms of the substantive shortcomings of Columbia's policy is beyond the scope of this
Note.
6 See Berger, supra note 4; Hentoff, supra note 4; Vincent, supra note 4.
7 See Berger, supra note 4; Hentoff, supra note 4; Vincent, supra note 4.
8 See Berger, supra note 4.
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the confidentiality of the proceedings, or retaliation against any per-
son bringing a complaint, will constitute separate violations of the
Sexual Misconduct Policy."9 The problem, opponents argue, is that
this strict confidentiality provision may deter the accused student
from approaching potential witnesses." As a result, the accused stu-
dent, who is not entitled to receive advance notice of the evidence,
but who has a strong interest in conducting his or her own investiga-
tion, is not afforded the opportunity to mount a successful defense."
On the other hand, supporters of the policy argue that it furthers
two important interests—namely, encouraging the reporting of sexual
misconduct and preventing potential witness intimidation. 12 Indeed,
several of the policy's provisions appear to protect victims of rape and
other serious sexual offenses from the additional trauma of being
forced to confront their attackers face-to-face or of being subjected to
cross-examination in a disciplinary hearing.' 3 Proponents of the pol-
icy maintain that empirical evidence indicates that to avoid this
trauma, victims often elect not to report attacks. 14 In fact, the policy
incorporates these concerns, recognizing that the reported incidents
of campus sexual assaults likely under-represent the number of actual
incidents and eliminating the former procedural requirement that
both parties be present at the hearing at all times."
In the face of ongoing public criticism over its policy, the Colum-
bia administration has staunchly defended the policy's provisions in-
sisting that the imposition of every criminal law due process require-
ment is "not necessary to ensure a fair and effective [disciplinary]
process." 10 In addition, the administration maintains that the policy
9 Sexual Misconduct Policy and Disciplinary Procedure, available at littp://www.columbia.
eduicu/sexualtnisconduct/policy.html.
m See Berger, supra note 4..
" See id.
15 See Arenson, supra note 3.
us See Vincent, .supra note 4; Ben Wheeler, Letter to the Editor, Due Protection, VILLAGE
VOICE (N.Y.), Nov. 8, 2000; Due Process at Columbia, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2000. For further
insight into the motivation behind the new policy see the Revised Report of the University
Senate 'Tisk Force to Review 7'lw Sexual Misconduct Policy and Procedure, Dec. 9, 1999, available at
littp://www.columbia.edu/ cu/settate/annuaLreports/00-00/TF1299.html [hereinafter
Revised Report].
14 See Revised Report, supra note 13.
15 See Revised Report, supra note 13.
18 See Arenson, supra note 3; Vincent, supra note 4. According to the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, lib-
erty or property, without due process of law." U.S. Corm.. amend. XIV, § 2. The United
States Supreme Court has defined Fourteenth Amendment Due Process to incorporate the
rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, including those guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
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affords accused students the basic due process standards required by the
University." Columbia is correct—unlike public schools, private col-
leges and universities are not bound by the due process provisions of
the Constitution; thus, they are permitted to establish and implement
their own disciplinary procedures. 18
 Historically, courts have been re-
luctant to interfere in the discipline decisions of private colleges and
universities and generally have required only that private schools sub-,
stantially observe the rules or guidelines they have adopted. 19
When called upon to review the disciplinary procedures of pri-
vate colleges and universities, courts have struggled to find a legal
ment ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. V). In general, procedural due process requires that as the pen-
alty becomes more serious, the formality of the procedures must increase. See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
17
 SeeArenson, supra note 3; Vincent, supra note 4. Because public colleges and univer-
sities are created by state constitutions or statutes and are funded by state taxes, they are
creatures of the states and their decisions, therefore, qualify as "state action" for Due Proc-
ess purposes. See Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 223 (7th Cir. 1993) (indicating that three
Illinois state universities are governed by separate state statutes); Goldberg v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that the University of
California, Berkeley, is a department or function of the state government pursuant to Arti-
cle IX, section 9, of state constitution). Public colleges and universities are bound by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and may not deprive a student of his educa-
tion without affording him procedural due process. See generally Robert B. Groholski, The
Right to Representation by Counsel in University Disciplinary Proceedings: A Denial of Due Process,
19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 739, 739 (1999) (arguing that students in public colleges and univer-
sities have both a liberty interest and a property interest in their education that require
protection by the Fourteenth Amendment and detailing federal and state court cases that
have addressed this issue). Groholski's article provides a good overview of judicial treat-
ment of a student's protected liberty and property interest in his or her education. See
Groholski, supra, at 750-67.
18 See Coveney v. Pres. of Coll. of the Holy Cross, 445 N.E.2d 136, 139 (Mass. 1983) ("A
college must have broad discretion in determining appropriate sanctions for violations of
its policies."); Anderson v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 1995 WL 813188, *1, *4 (Mass. Super. 1995)
(IA] private university has a right to manage its own affairs and to establish its own rules
and regulations in the conduct of the university's business and goals—including student
discipline."); Schulman v. Franklin & Marshall Coll., 538 A.2d 49, 52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
("A college ... must be self-governing and the courts should not become involved in that
process.").
ig See Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238, 244 (D. Vt. 1999); Holert v.
Univ. of Chi., 751 F. Stipp. 1294, 1301 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 735 N.E.2d
373, 381 (Mass. 2000); Anderson, 1995 WL 813188, at *4; Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 404
N.E.2d 1302, 1306 (NY 1980) ("[W]hen a university has adopted a rule or guideline es-
tablishing the procedure to be followed ... that procedure must be substantially ob-
served.").
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theory upon which to base their reviews. 20 Much of this struggle can
be attributed to the fact that, because the relationship between a stu-
dent and a university is unique, it is difficult to find an appropriate
doctrinal category." Like courts, commentators also continue to
search for a doctrine that will provide an appropriate standard to
guide the judicial review of disciplinary procedures in private colleges
and universities. 22
Although several different theories have been suggested, includ-
ing tort law, association law, and in loco parentis, courts most often have
employed contract law principles when reviewing university discipli-
nary procedures. 23 Some courts have applied contract law rather rig-
idly, whereas others, recognizing the inherent difficulties created by
treating the student-university relationship as a strictly commercial
arrangement, have adopted a "relaxed" contract approach." Courts
20 See Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622, 626 (10th Cir. 1975); Anderson,
1995 WL 813188, at *4; Tedeschi, 404 N.E.2d at 1304-05; Psi Upsilon of Phila. v. Univ. of Pa.,
591 A.2d 755, 758 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
21 See Slaughter, 514 F,2d at 626; Anderson, 1995 WL 813188, at *4; 7eyleschi, 404 N.E.2d
at 1304-05; Psi Upsilon of Phila„ 591 A.2d at 758.
22 See Hazel Glenn Bell, Student Versus University: The University's Implied Obligation of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 59 Mn. L. REV. 183, 215-18 (2000) ("Good faith and fair deal-
ing can provide a framework to adjudicate student claims that is not unduly intrusive.");
Curtis J. Berger & Vivian Berger, Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair Process for the University
Student, 99 Coutm. L. Rev. 289, 289 (1999); Note, An Overview: The Private University and
Due Process, 1970 DUKE L.J. 795, 803-06 (1970) (IT] he student-private university relation-
ship has been examined under several theories unrelated to constitutional law."); Note,
Common Law Rights for Private University Students: Beyond the State Action Principle, 84 YALE L.J.
120, 137 (1974) ("lilt is not surprising to find the cases floundering in a sea of doctrinal
doubt."); Scott R. Simon, Note, Judicial Intervention of Private University Expulsions: •idi-
tional Remedies and A Solution Sounding in Tort, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 223-30 (1997) ('The
unjust expulsion of a student from a university should lie in tort, and not contracts.").
23 See Slaughter, 514 F.2d at 626 (noting that although some elements of the law of con-
tracts should be used in the analysis of the relationship between the student and the Uni-
versity, contract law need not be rigidly applied); Tedeschi, 404 N.E.2d at 1304-06 (conclud-
ing that neither contract law 'tor association law are wholly satisfactory legal theories upon
which to predicate judicial review of university expulsions, but not finding it necessary to
resolve the issue in order to conduct a review). But see Anderson, 1995 WL 813188, at *3
(commenting that American courts have generally adopted the idea, although denounced
by commentators, that the student's relationship to the private university is contractually
governed by the documents he accepts at matriculation); Psi Upsilon of Phila„ 591 A.2d at
758 (noting that a majority of courts have characterized the relationship between a private
college and its students as contractual in nature).
24 See Holm, 751 F. Stipp. at 1300 (concluding that under Illinois law, a university and it
students have a contractual relationship, the terms of which are set forth in the university's
catalogs and manuals); Schaer, 735 N.E.2d at 378 (assuming the existence of a contract
between the student and the University and reviewing the student's allegations of a breach
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applying a relaxed or quasi-contract approach have articulated that
private schools should incorporate a requirement of "fundamental" or
"basic" fairness in disciplinary proceedings. 25 The particular parame-
ters of "fundamental" or "basic" fairness are difficult to discern, but a
careful analysis of the decisions points to several vital elements, in-
cluding a general requirement that the disciplinary procedures be
free from bias and prejudice. 26
This Note analyzes the methods by which courts have reviewed
challenges to disciplinary proceedings in private colleges and univer-
sities. Part LA outlines the challenges presented by cases involving
student-on-student sexual misconduct—arguably the most difficult
cases a school faces. 27 Part I.B examines the approaches taken by
courts that have reviewed private school disciplinary procedures, pay-
ing particular attention to what these courts have recommended to
avoid arbitrary decisiomnaking and to achieve "basic" or "fundamen-
tal" fairness.28 Part I.0 discusses the approaches of two commenta-
tors.29 Finally, Part II recommends that private colleges and universi-
ties write a disciplinary policy that enables them to balance the
interests of both the students and the school and further proposes
that courts hold private schools to a more rigorous standard of proce-
dural due process in their disciplinary proceedings."
I. BACKGROUND
A. Student-on-Student Sexual Misconduct: Balancing Competing Interests in
The "Toughest Cases"
In the 1990s, student-on-student sexual misconduct and the dis-
ciplinary responses to this behavior by colleges and universities
emerged as a topic of great interest in the popular press." In re-
by the school); Coveney, 445 N.E.2d at 138 (disposing of the case on the ground that the
college did not violate any contractual right of the student).
23 See Anderson, 1995 WI, 813188, at *4; Tedeschi, 404 N.E.2d at 1306; Psi Upsilon of
Phila., 591 A.2d at 758.
" See Anderson, 1995 WI., 813188, at *4; Tedeschi, 404 N.E.2d at 1306; Psi Upsilon of
Phila., 591 A.2d at 758.
27 See infra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 47-153 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 154-201 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 202-278 and accompanying text.
31 See Nina Bernstein, Behind Some Fraternity Walls, Brothers in Crime, N.Y. TIMES, May 6,
1996, at 1 (describing roll of fraternities in campus sexual misconduct cases); Nina Bern-
stein, College Campuses Hold Court In Shadows of Mixed Loyalties, N.Y, TIMES, May 5,1996, at 1
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sponse to this heightened awareness regarding campus sexual mis-
conduct, college and university administrators were under increased
pressure from student groups to structure disciplinary procedures
that were "victim-friendly." 2 As schools responded to these demands
and attempted to alleviate the stress inflicted on testifying rape and
sexual assault victims, a growing Counter-movement alleged that cam-
pus disciplinary systems had become strongholds of political correct-
ness." This group further charged that the rights of students accused
(discussing universities' internal procedures for investigating and adjudicating student-on-
student rape charges); Nina Bernstein, Yeats Late; Foniham Case Still Haunts Woman, N.Y
TIMES, May 5, 1996, at 1 (describing Fordham's procedure iii a campus rape case and de-
tailing harassment of victim by friends of the accused); Kathryn Kranhold & Katherine
Farrish, Anxiety About Sex, Dating, Rape Transforms College Life, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 10,
1993, at Al (noting increased awareness of student-on-student rape and discussing efforts
by colleges to use student conduct codes to prosecute allegations); John Silber, Students
Should Not Be Above the Law, N.Y. Timts, May 9, 1996, at 27 (noting that administration of
college judicial codes should not result in sanctuary from the law); Wes Smith, Thal and
Error? Did A University Go MO Far in Getting Tough on Date Rape?, Cm. TRIB., May 1, 1994
(Magazine), at 14 (discussing Valparaiso University's handling of a student-on-student rape
case). The increased attention given to student-on-student sexual assault on CR1311/115 also
may be traceable to an oft-quoted October 1985 Ms. Magazine survey, titled Date Rape: The
Story of an Epidemic and Those 117w Deny It, that found that one in four college women is the
victim of rape or attempted rape. See KATIE ROIPHE, THE Moartmo. Arm: SEX, FEAR AND
FEMINISM 6, 51 (1993).
52 See Smith, supra note 31, at 22. See'a/so MICHAEL CLAY SMITH & RICHARD FOSSEY,
CRIME ON CAMPUS: LEGAL ISSUES AND CAMPUS ADMINISTRATION 95-96 (1995). In addi-
tion, Congress, recognizing the value of rape awareness programs and special services for
sexual assault victims, passed the Ramstad Amendment in 1992, requiring colleges and
universities to develop campus sexual assault policies. See SMITH & FOSSEY, supra, at 79.
The law, codified at 20 U.S.C. §1092(f) (7) (1994), requires higher education institutions
to adopt policies to prevent sex offenses and procedures and to deal with sex offenses once
they have occurred. 20 U.S.C. §1092(f) (7). It also requires several procedural safeguards
including the right of both parties to have others present at the hearing and to he in-
formed of the outcome of any disciplinary hearing. See SMITH & FOSSEY, supra, at 79.
Smith and Fossey provide a comprehensive list of the Ranistad Amendment's other re-
quirements. See id.
53 See Smith, supra note 31, at 22 (citing a 1993 study on campus acquaintance rape by
the National Association of College and University Attorneys noting that student-on-
student sexual assault is "hands down the most difficult issue that comes up" for college
administrators). See generally KORS & SILVEROLATE, supra note 5. Kors and Silverglate argue
that the ultimate force of the "Shadow University" is its ability to punish students behind
closed doors, far from public and campus scrutiny, and to engage in a systematic assault on
due process. See id. at 4-5. See generally ROIPHE, supra note 31, at 6 (1993). Roiphe argues
that a "new bedroom politics" has entered universities and that there is disagreement over
how to define "rape." See id. at 6, 80-81. Recent definitions, according to Roiphe, stretch
beyond acts of violence or physical force to include even verbal coercion or manipulation.
See id. at 67. Roiphe 'suggests that "there , is a gray area in which someone's rape maybe
another person's bad night" and that the broad sweep of this definition has threatened to
unfairly minimize the experiences of victims of violent sexual assaults. See id. at 54, 81-82.
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of sexual misconduct are routinely trampled in campus Star Cham-
bers." Finally, schools have a legitimate and compelling interest in
protecting their public image, guarding against negative publicity,
preserving order on campus, and promoting the school's institutional
values. 35
The highly politicized tension between these competing move-
ments offers some insight into the difficulty schools face in investigat-
ing and adjudicating student-on-student sexual misconduct cases."
College administrators are faced with mounting pressure from both
sides.s7 Victims demand swift action and private hearings in which
they do not have to confront or face the accused.s 8 From the other
side, colleges face demands for procedures best designed to protect
the rights of accused students and ascertain the truth, including the
right to confront and cross-examine the accuser and other witnesses."
Because these interests directly conflict with one another, schools are
forced to assume the neutral role of referee and design a disciplinary
s4 See Smith, supra note 31, at 22; KORS & SILVERGLATE, supra note 5, at 289-311. Kors
and Silverglate are among the most outspoken critics of campus judicial procedures. See
KORS & SILVERGIATE, supra note 5, at 289-311. In The Shadow University, they charge that
"there is virtually no place left in the United States where kangaroo courts and Star Cham-
bers are the rule rather than the exception—except on college and university campuses
... where not only is arbitrariness widespread, but where fair procedures and rational fact-
finding mechanisms, with disturbing and surprising frequency, are actually precluded by
regulations." Id. at 276. See also DANIEL R. Cotztnui -r-rE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
HERITAGE: INTRODUCTORY MATERIALS 206-08 (1999) (defining the Court of Star Cham-
ber and noting that it has been portrayed as a bastion of tyranny based on its use of torture
and mutilation and the lack of jury trials).
" See Thomas R. Baker, Cross-Examination of Witnesses in College Student Disciplinary Hear-
ings: A New York Case Rekindles an Old Controversy, 142 Educ. L. Reptr. 11, 22-23; Paul E.
Rosenthal, Speak Now: The Accused Student's Right to Remain Silent in Public University Discipli-
nary Proceedings, 97 Comm. L. REV. 1241, 1247 (1997); Sinson, supra note 22, at 196-98;
Note, Private Government on the Campus—judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE U.
1362, 1392 (1963); Lisa Swent, Note, Due Process in Student Disciplinary Matters, 14 J.C. &
U.L. 359, 364 (1987).
3° See Baker, supra note 35, at 22-23; Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1247; Simon, supra
note 22, at 196-98. See also Mark S. Blaskey, University Students' Right to Retain Counsel for
Disciplinary Proceedings, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 65, 69 (1988) (maintaining that disciplinary
proceedings are by their very nature more complex because they involve adjudicating of-
fenses which might be deemed criminal).
37 See Columbia University's Sexual Misconduct Policy: Further Comments From a Former Stu-
dent Panelist, available at littp://www/columbLedu/cu/safer/backlash/formeipanelist.
lunil [hereinafter Further Comments].
3° See Further Comments, supra note 37; Amy M. Holmes, Men, Women: We're Not that Dif-
ferent, available at littp://www.odyssey.on.ca/–balaiicebeain/courts/ columbia.httn.
" See Blaskey, supra note 36, at 65; Sweni, supra note 35, at 382; Holmes, supra note 38.
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system that enables them to investigate and adjudicate these com-
plaints fairly and efficiently. 40
In addition to the campus political pressure that can influence
the contours of a school's disciplinary system, student-on-student sex-
ual misconduct cases are difficult from an evidentiary perspective. 41 In
cases of student-on-student sexual misconduct, the fact of sexual con-
tact is often not in dispute and consent is the principal—and perhaps
only—issue. 42 Moreover, these incidents typically occur in dormitory
rooms, and third-party eyewitnesses are rare. 45 Because alcohol is of-
ten involved and consensual foreplay typically precedes an acquain-
tance rape, physical evidence of an assault is often unavailable." Even
the presence of physical evidence of intercourse may not be disposi-
tive of misconduct if consent is at issue. 45 Thus, such disciplinary hear-
ings are susceptible to being reduced to a "he said/she said" credibil-
ity con test. 46
B. Judicial Review of Private School Disciplinary Proceedings
A public school student's right to procedural due process in dis-
ciplinary matters was first affirmed by the United States Court of Ap-
4° See Baker, supra note 35, at 22-23; John Friedl, Punishing Students for Non Academic
Misconduct, 26 J.C. & U.L. 701, 713 (2000); Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1247-48. See gener-
ally KORS & SILVERGLATE, supra note 5 (arguing that campus discipline systems administer
justice in a biased fashion and without due process). Critics have called into question the
ability of universities to prosecute and adjudicate allegations of offenses as serious as rape,
and some have suggested that schools coddle criminals whereas others have charged that
they run roughshod over the rights of the falsely accused. See Rosenthal, supra note 35, at
1248. This concern has led former Boston University President John Silber to conclude
that colleges should avoid disciplining these crimes and instead report them to the police.
See id. at 1249. The weakness of this argument is, as Rosenthal points out, that internal
adjudication may provide victims of sexual assault a friendlier atmosphere than the crimi-
nal courts. See id. at 1247-48.
41 See Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act of 1990 § 204(a), 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)
(1)-(6) (1994) (requiring universities to develop policies to encourage prompt reporting
of crimes to police and university officials); Higher Education Amendments of 1992 § 486,
20 U.S.C. §1092(f) (1) (F), (f) (7) (1994) (requiring universities to develop and imple-
ment policies against sexual assault and compile and report statistics on sexual assault);
Baker, supra note 35, at 23; Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1247.
42 See Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1247.
43 See Baker, supra note 35, at 22-23; Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1247.
44 See Baker, supra note 35, at 22-23; Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1247.
45 See Baker, supra note 35, at 22-23; Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1297.
46 See Baker, supra note 35, at 22-23; Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1247. See also Richard
C. Calm, Sexual Harassment on Campus: Does the Accused Have Any Rights?, 11 Tonna L. REV.
579, 580 (1995) (noting that even groundless allegations of sexual misconduct, like those
of rape, can irreversibly damage reputations and ruin careers).
662	 Boston College Law Review
	
[Vol. 42:653
peals for the Fifth Circuit in 1961 in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of
Education.47 In Dixon, Alabama State College attempted to expel six
students on grounds of misconduct, without showing .
 the students de-
tailed charges or any of the evidence against therm" The Fifth Circuit
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires notice and some opportunity for hearing before a student at a
public university is expelled for misconduct:19
Fourteen years later, the United States Supreme Court provided
more precise contours of Dixon 5° In 1975, in Goss tt Lopez, the Su-
preme Court held that even students facing a temporary suspension
must be afforded notice of the charges against them and an opportu-
nity to be heard.51 In Goss, nine Columbus, Ohio high schools stu-
dents alleged that they had been suspended for up to ten days without
a hearing, in violation of the procedural due process component of
the Fourteenth Amendment.52 Noting that the Due Process Clause
forbids arbitrary deprivations of liberty, the Supreme Court held that
a student facing suspension of ten days or less must be given oral or
written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the evi-
dence against him and an opportunity to present his side of the
47 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961).
48 See id. at 154-55. The students were not granted a hearing prior to their expulsion
and the notice of expulsion mailed to them assigned no specific ground for expulsion. See
id. at 151-52, 154. Moreover, the members of the State Board of Education who voted to
expel the students assigned "somewhat varying and differing grounds for their decision."
See id. at 159. This "outrageous action" of the Alabama officials prompted the Fifth Circuit
to cite what it termed the "eloquent comment" by Professor Warren A. Seavey in his article
Dismissal of Students: Due Process, 70 HARV. L. Rev. 1406, 1407(1957): It is shocking that the
officials of a state educational institution, which can function properly only if our free-
doms are preserved, should not understand the elementary principles of fair play. It is
equally shocking to find that a court supports them in denying to a student the protection
given to a pickpocket." See id. at 158.
49 See Dixon, 294 F.2d. at 158. In dictum, the court went on to state its views on the na-
ture of the notice and hearing required prior to expulsion: the notice should contain a
statement of the specific charges and the grounds which, if proven, would justify expul-
sion. See id. The nature of the hearing, the court stated, should vary depending upon the
circumstances of the particular case. See id. Because charges of misconduct depend upon a
collection of the facts concerning the charged misconduct, easily colored by the point of
view of the witnesses, hearings in these cases at best protect the rights of all involved if the
administrative authorities are given an opportunity to hear both sides in considerable de-
tail. See id. at 158-59. The Fifth Circuit was not suggesting that a full-dress judicial hearing
was required, but noted that the rudiments of an adversary proceeding may be preserved
without encroaching upon the interests of the college. See id. at 159.
95 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579-80 (1975).
51 See id. at 581. In a footnote, the Court indicated its approval of Dixon, explicitly re-
felling to it as a landmark decision." See id. at 576 n.8.
32 See id. at 568.
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story." Expressly confining its holding to short suspensions (those not
exceeding ten days) the Court, in dictum, noted that longer suspen-
sions or expulsions might require more formal procedures,"
The Supreme Court further refined its academic due process ju-
risprudence in subsequent cases by recognizing two important distinc-
tions—that between academic and disciplinary matters and that be-
tween public and private universities. 55 In 1978, in Board of Curators of
the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, the Court made it dear that it
would grant greater deference to public schools in decisionmaking in
academic, as opposed to disciplinary, dismissals and, indeed, would
require more stringent procedural requirements in dismissals based
upon purely disciplinary matters. 56 Furthermore, in 1982, in Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn, the Court held that, as a general matter, students at-
tending private universities do not possess the same due process rights
constitutionally guaranteed to students attending public schools.57
Accordingly, courts have been more reluctant to review the discipli-
nary decisions of private schools and have maintained a deferential
posture toward private school decisionmaking, particularly in internal
disciplinary affairs. 58 In the absence of constitutional protections,
" See id. at 581. Explaining its holding in more detail, the Court commented that re-
quiring effective notice and an informal hearing permitting the student to give his version
of the events will provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous action. See id. at 583. The
disciplinary administrator may then summon the accuser, permit cross-examination and
allow the accused student to present his own witnesses, resulting in discretion that is snore
informed and a risk of error that is substantially reduced. See id.
54 See id. at 584.
55 See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 846 (1982); Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of
Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86 (1978).
56, See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 86.
57 See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 846. In an explanation of why private entities are not
subject to a state action claim, the Court stated, "Embedded in our Fourteenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence is a dichotomy between state action, which is subject to scrutiny under
the Amendment's Due Process Clause, and private conduct, against which the Amendment
affords no shield, no matter how unfair that conduct may be." NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488
U.S 179, 191 (1988).
" See Holert v. Univ. of Chi., 751 F. Supp. 1294, 1301 (N.D. III. 1990) (commenting
that courts adopt a deferential standard regarding university discipline decisions because
of a reluctance to interfere with the regulation of student conduct in a private university);
Anderson v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 1995 WL 813188, *1, *4 (Mass. Super. 1995) (noting that
a court may only intervene in the student-university relationship when the student demon-
strates that the university action was arbitrary and capricious); Psi Upsilon of Phila. v. Univ.
of Pa., 591 A.2d 755, 758 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (noting that courts are generally more re-
luctant to interfere in the disciplinary proceedings of a private college than those of a
public college); Schulman v. Franklin & Marshall Coll., 538 A.2d 49, 52 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988) (indicating that because a college is a unique institution which, to the degree possi-
ble, must be self-governing, courts should not become involved in internal disciplinary
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courts generally have required that private school disciplinary proce-
dures adhere to a "fundamental" or "basic" fairness standard and not
be arbitrary or capricious.59
 More precisely, state and federal courts
have often held that a private school's disciplinary decisions are fun-
damentally fair if they comport with the rules and procedures that the
school itself has promulgated.6°
1. State Court Decisions
In 2000, in Schaer u Brandeis University, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts ("SJC") held that in disciplining students, a
university should follow its own rules and that a failure to do so may
procedures unless the process has been found to be biased, prejudicial or lacking in due
process).
" See Cloud v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 720 F.2d 721, 725 (1st Ci•. 1983) ("We also ex-
amine the hearing to ensure that it was conducted with basic fairness."); Fellheimer v.
Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Stipp. 238, 244 (D. Vt. 1994) ("The College has agreed to provide
students with proceedings that conform to a standard of 'fundamental fairness' and to
protect students from arbitrary and capricious disciplinary action to the extent possible
within the system it has chosen to use."); Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 735 N.E.2d 373, 380
(Mass. 2000) ("In addition to reviewing the allegations of breach of contract, He ...
examine the hearing to ensure that it was conducted with basic fairness."); Coveney v Pres.
of Coll. of the Holy Cross, 445 N.E.2d 136, 138 (Mass. 1983) ("[Al private university, col-
lege, or school may not arbiu•arily or capriciously dismiss a student."); Ahlum v. Adn ► rs of
the Tulane Educ. Fund, 617 So. 2d 96, 98-99 (La. Ct. App. 1993) rile disciplinary deci-
sions of a private school may be reviewed for arbitrary and capricious action."); Psi Upsilon
of Phila., 591 A.2d at 760 ("[C]ourts should not interfere with internal procedure and dis-
cipline unless real prejudice, bias or denial of due process is present."). See also Anderson,
1995 WL 813188, at *4—*5 ("A court may only intervene in the student-university relation-
ship when the student demonstrates that the university's action was arbitrary and capri-
cious."). The Anderson court provided a comprehensive list of circumstances that would
render a school's action arbitrary and capricious, including a failure to follow its own dis-
ciplinary rules and a failure to afford the student a hearing that was fundamentally fait See
id. at *4. Further, the court suggested that "at the very least" the student should be pro-
vided written notice of the charges against him; a written description of the evidence upon
which the charges are based; the names of the witnesses the school intends to call at the
hearing; an unbiased disciplinary committee or tribunal; an opportunity to be heard and
present witnesses in his behalf; and the right to confront and controvert the evidence pre-
sented by the university. See id.
6° See Fellheimer, 869 F. Stipp. at 244 (concluding that the College can breach its obliga-
tion to students only by deviating from its own procedures in such a way that the discipli-
nary action at issue is fundamentally unfair, arbitrary or capricious); Holert, 751 F. Supp. at
1301 (holding that the student was entitled only to those procedural safeguards the Uni-
versity agreed to provide); Tedeschi, 404 N.E.2d at 1306 (holding that when a university
adopted a rule or guideline establishing the procedure to be followed in relation to a sus-
pension or expulsion that procedure must be substantially observed).
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constitute a breach of contract. 61 In this case, David Arlen Schaer, a
student at Brandeis University, filed a complaint against the school
seeking injunctive relief and compensatory damages after the Board
on Student Conduct suspended him for four months for engaging in
"unwanted sexual activity" and creating a "hostile environment."62 Af-
ter the suspension, the University Appeals Board on Student Conduct
denied Schaer's request for a new hearing. 63 Three weeks later, Schaer
filed a complaint in the Massachusetts Superior Court, alleging that in
unfairly disciplining him, Brandeis had not substantially conformed
to its disciplinary process and, therefore, was in breach of contract."
The Superior Court denied Schaer's request for an injunction and
granted Brandeis' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted. 65 On appeal, the Massa-
chusetts Appeals Court reversed the Superior Court in part, conclud-
ing that Brandeis "did not substantially conform its disciplinary proc-
ess" to its own procedures as outlined in the "Rights and
Responsibilities" section of its student handbook, which serves as a
contract between the student and the school. 66
Reviewing the case, the SJC considered Schaer's allegations and
determined that he had not, in fact, stated a claim upon which relief
could be granted.67 The court did not, however, end its analysis there;
it went. on to examine the hearing to ensure that it had been con-
ducted with "basic fairness." 68 Schaer argued that the proceeding was
61 See Schaer, 735 N.E.2d at 378, 381. The parties had stipulated to the existence of a
contractual relationship. See id. at 378.
62 See id. at 376. The facts surrounding the Brandeis case are similar to those played out
on college campuses nationwide. See Bernstein, supra note 31, at 1; Kranhold & Farrish,
supra note 31, at Al. On March 26, 1996, a female student filed a report with the Brandeis
student judicial system. See Schaer, 735 N.E.2d at 376. In the report, she stated that in the
early hours of February 14, she spoke with Schaer on the telephone and that he then came
to her dormitory room where they began kissing. See id. She alleged that she told Schaer
that she "did not want to have sex," but that when she later awoke from sleep she found
Schaer having intercourse with her. See id.
63 See Schaer, 735 N.E.2d at 376.
64 See id.
63 See id. at 377.
65 See Schaer, 735 N.E.2d at 378-79. The Appeals Court characterized the violations as:
(1) failure to make careful evaluation of the facts and of the credibility of persons report-
ing them as required by section 17 of the (contract]; (2) failure to make a record of the
proceedings of the board, as required by section 19.4; (3) .receipt of irrelevant and
inflammatory evidence, in violation of section 19.13; (4) failure to apply 'clear and con-
vincing evidence standard prescribed by section 19.13 of the [contract]; and (5) failure to
accord Schaer the process due under section 18.11 of the [contract]. See id. at 378-79.
67 See id. at 378-80.
63 Sre id. at 380.
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unfair because the testimony of four witnesses was improperly admit-
ted at the hearing.69 The majority expressly rejected this argument,
noting that a university discipline board is not required to follow the
same rules of evidence employed in a court proceeding." Further dis-
tinguishing a university disciplinary proceeding from a court of law,
the court explained that a university "may choose to admit all state-
ments by every witness or it may choose to exclude some evidence?" .
Adhering to the well-established principle that courts are "chary
about interfering" with the disciplinary decisions made by private col-
leges and universities, the court continued that "it is not the business
of lawyers and judges to tell universities what statements they may
consider and what statements they must reject?" Further, the court
noted that a university must have broad discretion in determining ap-
propriate sanctions for violations of its policies." Filially, the court
stated that a university is not required to adhere to the standards of
due process guaranteed to criminal defendants or to abide by the
rules of evidence adopted by courts. 74
Although it rejected Schaer's breach of contract claim and found
that Schaer was not denied "basic fairness," the majority, in dictum,
suggested several procedural safeguards that schools might adopt to
ensure that disciplinary proceedings are conducted with basic fair-
ness." For example, in addressing Schaer's complaint that the record
of the hearing was "insufficient," the court indicated that because the
applicable provision in the "Rights and Responsibilities" section of the
student handbook did not require that the testimony of each individ-
ual witness be summarized, or that the record be any minimum
length, Brandeis was in compliance with this provision." The court
commented, however, that the report was extremely brief and sug-
gested that the better practice would have been to produce a more
complete report. 77
55 See id.
7° See id.; see also Psi Upsilon of Phila., 591 A.2d at 760 ("[A Discipline] Board is not sub-
ject to strict rules of judicial procedure.").
7 ' See Schaer, 735 N.E.2d at 380.
72 Id.
73 See id. at 381.
74 See id.
75 See id. at 379-80.
76 See Schaer, 735 N.E.2d at 379-80. Over the course of the five hour hearing, thirteen
witnesses testified and the summary of their testimony consisted of only twelve lines! See id.
at 384 (Ireland, J., dissenting).
77 See id. at 380.
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In a well-reasoned and powerful dissent, Justice Roderick L. Ire-
land faulted the majority for its failure to analyze the provisions in the
"Rights and Responsibilities" section of the student handbook in a
manner consistent with the standard principles of contract interpreta-
tion." More specifically, because Brandeis issued the handbook uni-
laterally and students had no meaningful opportunity to negotiate the
terms therein, the ambiguities should be construed against the
school." Justice Ireland next recognized the unique problem faced by
private colleges and universities in balancing the interests of student
victims of sexual assault and students accused of sexual assault. 8°
Nonetheless, Justice Ireland concluded that in a hearing on a serious
disciplinary matter there is too much at stake for a university to fail to
follow the rules it has itself articulated."
Other state courts have adopted a substantially similar ap-
proach.82 In 1993, in Ahlum v. Administrators of Tulane Educational
Fund, the Court of Appeals ,of Louisiana held that the disciplinary de-
cision of a private university could be reviewed only for arbitrary and
capricious action, and that neither the university's disciplinary proce-
dures nor the evidence it relied on in this case were sufficiently
deficient to render the university's decision arbitrary and capricious. 85
In Ahlum, Tulane University's Joint Hearing Board and Appellate
Committee found that a student, Sean Ahlum, violated Tulane's Stu-
dent Conduct Rule III(A) (1), which prohibits a student from
"[c] ausing harm or reasonable apprehension of physical harm includ-
ing sexual assault."84 Ahlum filed for relief in Civil District Court,
seeking to enjoin the University from imposing a suspension on the
grounds that the proceedings were unfairly conducted.85 In particular,
Ahlum argued that he was denied legal counsel and forced to cross-
examine witnesses on his own during the hearing; that the University
employed an experienced prosecutor to present its case and cross-
examine witnesses; and that his right to an appeal was effectively
eliminated.86 The trial court granted a preliminary injunction and
78 See id. at 382 (Ireland, J., dissenting).
79 See id. at 382 (Ireland, J., dissenting).
88 See id. at 382-83 (Ireland, J., dissenting).
81 See Schaer, 735 N.E.2d at 383 (Ireland, J., dissenting).
82 See Anderson, 1995 WL 813188, at *4—'1'5; Coveney, 445 N.E.2d at 138.
83 See Ahlum, 617 So. 2d at 98-99,101.
84 Id.
85 Id.
88 See id. at 99-100,101.
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ordered a new hearing to reconsider the charges." The court further
ordered that a written record of the proceedings be made." Tulane
appealed the judgment and asserted, inter alia, that the trial court was
without the power to enjoin a private school from implementing an
internal disciplinary decision. 89
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals for Louisiana first
noted that a private institution is "entitled to a very strong but rebut-
table presumption that its internal administrative actions are taken in
good faith" and has the power to "create, administer and implement
its own rules and procedures concerning . . . the conduct of its stu-
dents."9° Although the court acknowledged that the role of the judici-
ary is not to substitute its own judgment for that of a private school on
the appropriate standards of student conduct or the appropriate pen-
alty for a breach of those standards, it nevertheless conceded that un-
der some circumstances a court may review a private school's discipli-
nary decisions.91 Like the court in Fellheimer v. Middlebury College
(discussed below), the Ahlum court specifically commented that its
adherence to a policy of judicial restraint in this arena does not sug-
gest that a private institution can maintain egregious policies or that a
school's power is otherwise absolute." In a clear articulation of this
position, the court announced that "due process safeguards in private
schools cannot be cavalierly ignored or disregarded.' The court
concluded, moreover, that a private school's disciplinary decisions
could be reviewed for arbitrary and capricious action. 94
87 See id. at 98.
88 See Ahlum, 617 So. 2d at 98. This hearing would have been Sean Ahlum's third hear-
ing before the Joint Hearing Board. See id. at 97. At the first hearing the board unani-
mously found him in violation of rule Ill (A) (1). See id. Ahlum appealed this finding to the
Appellate Committee who overturned the joint Hearing Board's decision and remanded it
to the Hearing board because copies of the Louisiana criminal statute on 'simple rape"
had been placed in the record, prior to the hearing, without Ahlum's knowledge. See id.
The second hearing again resulted in a unanimous finding that Ahlum violated rule 111(A)
(1). See id. At the second hearing, the tape recorder malfunctioned and no recording of
the hearing was made and no transcript of the proceeding was available for appellate re-
view. See id.
88
 See id. at 98.
88 See id.
9 t See id. at 98-99.
92 See id. at 99.
98 See Ahlum, 617 So. 2d at 99.
9° See id.
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After providing definitions of "arbitrary" and "capricious," the
court turned to the facts of the case. 95 The court found that Tulane
had an "intricate system of hearings" at which Ahlum had an oppor-
tunity to present his version of the facts and to confront the witnesses
against him." Further, Tulane took great pains to inform Ahlum of
the charges against him and allowed him an opportunity to present
his case in what the court termed a "non-adversarial" forum.97 The
court thus held that after two separate hearings and two appeals it
could not reasonably conclude that Tulane reached an unreasoned or
thoughtless decision." In fact, the court was impressed by Tulane's
procedural safeguards and commented that the process afforded to
Ahlum may have exceeded the due process required in public schools
as envisioned by the United States Supreme Court. 99
2. Federal Court Decisions
Like the state courts, federal courts have similarly held private
schools to a "basic" or "fundamental" fairness standard.'" In 1994, in
Fellheimer v. Middlebury College, for example, the United States District
Court for the District of Vermont held that Middlebury College was
contractually bound to provide students with the procedural safe-
guards it promised in its publications."' Ethan Fellheimer, a student
who had been suspended for one year after the College found him
"not guilty of rape," but guilty of "disrespect for persons, specifically
for engaging in inappropriate sexual activity" with a female student,
brought a breach of contract claim against the College.'" In particu-
lar, Fellheimer alleged that his relationship with the College was a
contractual one, the terms of which were enumerated in the Middle-
bury College Handbook.'" According to Fellheimer, these terms in-
cluded the College's promise to provide students accused of discipli-
nary violations procedural protections equivalent to those that are
95 See id. The court defined arbitrary as a "disregard of evidence or of the proper
weight thereof" and capricious as a "conclusion made without substantial evidence or a
conclusion contrary to substantial evidence." See id.
99 See id. at 99.
97 See id. at 99, 100.
98 See. Ahlum, 617 So. 2d at 99.
" See id.
I" See A & B c. C. Coll. & D., 863 F. Supp. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Holert, 751 F. Supp.
at 1300-01.
141 See Fellheimer, 869 F. Supp. at 241.
DU M.
195 See id. at 242.
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required under the United States Constitution.'" Conversely, the Col-
lege argued that the unique relationship between a college and a stu-
dent, especially with respect to disciplinary proceedings, precludes
the rigid application of contract law. 1°5 In support of its argument, the
College relied on Slaughter v. Brigham Young University—a Tenth Cir-
cuit case, holding that although some elements of the law of contracts
should be used in the analysis of the relationship between a student
and a university, this requirement does not mean that contract law
must be rigidly applied in all its aspects. 06
The Fellheimer court concluded that there was no legal bar to the
plaintiff's breach of contract claim and that the College was contrac-
tually bound to provide students with the procedural safeguards that
it promised. 107 In making its determination, the court looked to an
earlier Vermont case, Merrow v Goldberg, 108 which found that the rela-
tionship between a student and a college is contractual in nature and
thus a college has an obligation to conduct its hearings in a manner
consistent with the terms of its handbook.'"
The Fellheimer court then examined exactly what was promised in
the handbook to determine whether the College breached its obliga-
tions to the plaintiff.'" As a threshold matter, the court referenced
the language of the handbook and rejected Fellheimer's contention
that the College promised to provide procedural protections equiva-
lent to those required under the Constitution. 111 On the contrary, as
the court noted, the handbook explicitly states that a student's due
process rights "cannot be coextensive with or identical to the rights
afforded in a civil or criminal legal proceeding." 112 The handbook
does, however, provide that the procedures are designed to "assure
fundamental fairness, and to protect students from arbitrary or capri-
' 04 See id.
105 See id. at 243. In a bizarre argument, Middlebury also urged the court to rule that
the handbook does not create enforceable contractual obligations because: it was unilater-
ally developed by the College; its provisions were not bargained for by the plaintiff; and its
broad informational nature is such that no rational trier of fact could conclude that the
parties intended to enter into a contract on the terms contained in the handbook. See id. at
242-93.
06 See Fellheimer, 869 F. Supp. at 243 (citing Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d
622,626 (10th Cir. 1975)).
107 See Fellheimer, 869 F. Supp. at 293.
108
 SeeMerrow v. Goldberg, 672 F. Supp. 766,774 (D. Vt. 1987).
109 See Fellheimer, 869 F. Supp. at 293(citing Alerrow, 672 F. Stipp. at 774).
110 See Fellheimer, 869 F. Supp. at 292-94.
111 See id.
112 id,
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cious disciplinary actions." 1 " Additionally, as the court pointed out,
the provisions of the handbook left the College considerable
flexibility with respect to the specific procedures it could use in a par-
ticular hearing, effectively creating an "escape route" to prevent the
requirement of scrupulous adherence to stated procedures." 4 The
existence of this escape provision did not, however, lead the court to
the conclusion that the College would be free to administer discipli-
nary proceedings in any manner it desired." 5 Instead, the court
pointed out that because the College had agreed to provide students
with proceedings that conform to a standard of "fundamental fair-
ness" and to protect them from arbitrary and capricious disciplinary
action, a deviation from its own procedures could result in a breach of
this obligation." 8
Finally, the court in Fellheimer examined whether the College ac-
tually breached its obligation to Fellhehner." 7 The plaintiff alleged
three claims: (1) that the Dean's participation in the case as both
"prosecutor" and "judge" made the proceeding fundamentally unfair;
(2) that the charge of "disrespect of persons" is impermissibly vague;
and (3) that the notice Fellheimer received was insufficient because
he was not informed that "disrespect of persons" was a separate and
distinct charge from "rape" or "sexual assault." 118 Of these three
claims, the court summarily dismissed the first two based upon a plain
language reading of the handbook's provisions." 8 The court found
the third claim more troubling)" The language of the handbook
provided that when charges are brought against a student, the Col-
" 3 Id. at 243-44.
114 See Fellheimer, 869 F. Supp. at 244. The handbook states in part: "The following pro-
cedures are designed to promote fairness, and will be adhered to as faithfully as possible. If
exceptional circumstances dictate variation from these procedures, the variation will not
invalidate a decision unless it prevented a fair hearing or abrogated the rights of a stu-
dent." Id.
ne SO! Fellheimer, 869 F. Supp. at 244.
110 See id.
117 See id. at 244-46.
118 See id. at 244-45.
119 See id. at 294-95. As to the first claim, the court found that the handbook itself pro-
vides that the Dean of Students may serve in both roles and indeed may alone decide a
case in which she has transmitted the charges. See id. at 244 n.l. As to the second claim,
here again the handbook clearly indicates that "respect for persons and property" is ex-
pected and that violation of that provision may result in dismissal. See id at 244. Although
admitting that this broad language could encompass a wide variety of conduct, the court
determined that it would be "very impractical for a college to spell out every specific of-
fense which could lead to disciplinary action." See id. at 245 n.2.
12° See Fellheimer, 869 F. Supp. at 244.
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lege shall "state the nature of the charges with sufficient particularity
to permit the accused party to meet the charges." 121 Based upon un-
disputed facts, Fellheimer received a letter from the Dean's office in-
forming him that he was being charged with rape—none of the sub-
sequent correspondence provided any notice that there were two
charges pending rather than just one. 122
 As a result, Fellheimer was
prepared to defend himself only against the rape charge, which he
did successfully. 123
 He was not told that he was being charged with a
second offense, and thus, was unable to defend against that charge.t 24
Such a deviation from the procedures established by the College, ac-
cording to the court, made the hearing fundamentally unfair. 125
Similarly, in 1983, in Cloud v. Trustees of Boston University, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that Boston
University's disciplinary hearing in the case of a student charged with
misconduct was conducted with basic fairness and did not violate the
student's contractual rights. 126
 In this case, Leevonn Cloud, a third-
year law student, was charged with four separate incidents of serious
misconduct for peeping under women's skirts in the university li-
brary. 127
 The University conducted a disciplinary hearing in accor-
dance with the Provisional Student Code ("PSC"), a copy of which was
sent to Cloud along with a statement of the charges. 128
 The PSC, a
comprehensive set of guidelines and regulations, affords students a
number of procedural rights and "protections of due process." 129 The
PSC also outlines the procedures governing the actual disciplinary
hearing. 1" Notably, these governing procedures provide that confor-
ill Id. at 245.
122 See id. at 245.
1" See id.
124 See id. at 246.
125
 See Fellheimer, 869 F. Supp. at 246.
I" See 720 F.2d 721, 724-25 (1st Cir. 1983).
' 27 Id. at 723. Cloud allegedly engaged in the conduct while crawling on all fours tin-
der tables where the women were seated. Id.
128 Id. Cloud argued that his hearing should have been governed by the Law School
Disciplinary Rules (LSDR) rather than the PSC because he was a member of the law school
community. See id. at 724. The court expressly rejected this argument, noting that students
are subjected both to the rules of Boston University and the regulations of the School of
Law. See id.
' 29 Id. at 723. Among these protections, a student accused of misconduct is entitled to:
(1) notice in writing of the alleged violation and the time and place of the hearing; (2) the
right to he represented at the hearing by counsel; (3) the right to have the case decided by
an impartial judicial body; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine any witness; and
(5) the right to call witnesses and introduce evidence. See id.
130 Id.
2001]	 Student Disciplinary Proceedings 	 673
mity to the rules of procedure employed in a judicial proceeding is
not required.'" Similarly, the procedures provide that the rules of
evidence do not govern the hearing.'" Instead, the PSC allows the
Hearing Examiner, a licensed attorney, the discretion to make protec-
tive rulings to exclude unreliable or prejudicial evidence.'"
After a twenty hour hearing in which Cloud, who was represented
by counsel, testified on his own behalf and presented nine witnesses
(the University presented six witnesses), the Judicial Committee
found him guilty of all four charges and expelled him from the Uni-
versity.'" Cloud unsuccessfully appealed the decision to the President
of Boston University and subsequently brought a diversity action in
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, in which
he alleged violations of his contractual rights due to the improper
conduct of the hearing.'" The court granted Boston University's mo-
tion for summary judgment and Cloud filed an appeal.'"
On appeal, the First Circuit examined the disciplinary heating
and reviewed the procedures to ensure that the hearing was con-
ducted with basic fairness.'" In support of his claim, Cloud argued
that the technical rules of procedure and evidence should have gov-
erned the proceeding. and that the Hearing Examiner's selective utili-
zation of the rules to resolve procedural questions during the hearing
was fundamentally unfair. 138 Cloud also maintained that the hearing
was unfair because the Hearing Examiner issued a limiting instruction
that. allowed the introduction of the transcript from Cloud's 1970
rape trial in a Maryland court. Furthermore, Cloud alleged that be-
cause one of the University's witnesses was allowed to testify without
being confronted by Cloud, the 'hearing was in violation of the PSC's
See Cloud, 720 F.2d at 723.
I" Id.
"5 Id. The PSC governing procedures also establish that the Judicial Committee, a
three-member panel selected from the faculty, student body and administration, is the sole
arbiter of the weight of the evidence, demeanor and credibility of witnesses, guilt or inno-
cence of the student and the appropriateness of any sanctions imposed. See id.
154 Id. at 724.
"5 Id.
1 " Cloud, 720 F.2d at 724.
197
	 id. at 724-25. The court explained that in Massachusetts, the standard of basic
fairness was expressed implicitly in Coveney n President & Trustees of the College of the Holy
Coss, where the Supreme Judicial Court held that "if school officials act in good faith and
on reasonable grounds ... their decision to suspend or expel a student will not be subject
to successful challenge in the courts." See Coveney, 445 N.E.2d at 139.
I" See Cloud, 720 F.2d at 725.
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guarantee of the "right to confront and cross examine any witness." 139
Finally, Cloud argued that the transcript was unduly prejudicial and
inflaminatorym and that the anonymous testimony gave the Judicial
Committee the wrong impression that Cloud was a threat to the wit-
ness."'
The court considered each of Cloud's objections individually and
concluded that none of them rendered the hearing unfair. 142 In re-
jecting Cloud's charge that the Hearing Examiner unfairly applied
the rules of evidence and procedure, the court endorsed the Hearing
Examiner's decision to refer to court-established evidentiary and pro-
cedural rules in making his own decisions."'" The court concluded,
however, that although reference to the court's technical rules is de-
sirable, it need not trigger full application of those rules. 144 In the
court's view, such a requirement would discourage references of this
nature by making theni a straitjacket for the university.'" More
specifically, the court found that any prejudice or stigma caused by
the use of the transcript from Cloud's trial was outweighed by the
probative value such evidence has on the issue of sanctions and in
judging the credibility of witnesses.'" In addition, the court reasoned
that Cloud's right to confront witnesses was not abrogated by the
Hearing Examiner's decision to shield one witness from his view. 147
According to the court, Cloud was given the opportunity to cross-
examine and his attorney and the Judicial Committee were permitted
to view the witness.'" Moreover, the court found that the Hearing Ex-
aminer's decision to allow a nervous and frightened witness to testify
out of Cloud's sight was a reasonable exercise of his discretion and
did not render the hearing unfair or violate any of Cloud's rights.'"
139
 See id.
140 See
141 See id. at 725.
142 See id.
I° See Cloud, 720 F.2d at 725.
'" See id.
145 See id.
146 See id.
147 See id.
148 Cloud, 720 F.2d at 725.
149 Id. Cloud advanced several other arguments that the court definitively rejected. See
id. at 725. First he argued that the as the University's counsel, the Hearing Examiner was
biased, thus violating the contractual right to an "impartial judicial body." See id. Here the
court noted that the guarantee of impartiality pertained to the Judicial Committee, not the
Hearing Examiner. See id. Second, Cloud objected to the University's failure to produce
employees whose testimony Cloud requested. See id. at 726. The court noted that the PSC
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Therefore, after considering and rejecting each of Cloud's challenges,
the court held that the hearing was conducted with basic fairness. 15°
In summary of the above, although courts have been reluctant to
interfere in the disciplinary procedures of private colleges and uni-
versities and more reluctant to spell out the precise contours of a pri-
vate school's obligation to its students, reviewing state and federal
courts have nevertheless established a minimum standard with which
'private school disciplinary proceedings should comply.'" The lan-
guage employed has varied, IAA most courts require that private
schools comply with their own published procedures and regulations
and act reasonably. 152 Few courts have been willing to require that pri-
vate schools afford students the panoply of procedural protections
provided to criminal defendants or even public university students.'"
C. Commentators' Recommendations for "Fundamental Fairness"
Whereas courts have consistently argued that private colleges and
universities should be afforded wide latitude to develop and imple-
ment their student disciplinary policies and procedures, commenta-
tors have long .argued for increased procedural safeguards.'" Most
does not guarantee subpoena powers andl Cloud was provided the opportunity to present
his own witnesses and cross-examine the University witnesses. See id.
150 Id. at 726.
131 See Ahhtm, 617 So. 2d at 98-99; Schaer, 735 .N.E.2d at 381; Anderson, 1995 WL
813188, at *4; Psi Upsilon of Phila., 591 A.2d at 760.
133 See Fellheimer, 869 F. Stipp. at 246 (finding that the College's deviation from the pro-
cedures it established did render the hearing fundamentally unfair); Coveney, 445 N.E.2d at
138-39 (noting that although a private school may not arbitrarily or capriciously dismiss a
student, if school officials act in good faith and on reasonable grounds, their decision to
expel a student will not be subject to successful challenge in court); Anderson, 1995 WL
813188, at *4 (concluding that a court may only intervene in the student-university rela-
tionship when, inter alia, the university failed to follow its own rules and did not afford the
student a hearing which was fundamentally fair); Thleschi, 404 N.E.2d at 1303, 1306.
113 See Schaer, 735 N.E.2d at 381 (commenting that a university is not required to ad-
here to the standards of due process guaranteed to criminal defendants or to abide by
rules of evidence adopted by courts); Coveney, 445 N.E.2d at 140 (noting that because the
college is a private institution, plaintiff had no constitutional right to a hearing or to have
an attorney present); Psi Upsilon of Phila., 591 A.2d at 760 (pointing out that a private
School is not subject to strict rules of judicial procedure).
lm See Baker, supra note 35, at 11; Beh, supra note 22, at 183; Berger & Berger, supra
note 22, at 289; Blaskey, supra note 36, at 65; John Friedl, supra note 40, at 701; Edward J.
Golden, Procedural Due Process for Students at Public Colleges and Universities, 11 J.C. & U.L.
337, 337 (1982); Groholski, supra note 17, at 739; Note, An Overview: The Private University
and Due Process, supra note 22, at 795; Note, Common Law Rights for Private University Stu-
dents: Beyond the State Action Principle, supra note 22, at 120; James M. Picozzi, University Dis-
ciplinary Process: What's Fain What's Due, and What You Don't Get, 96 YALE U. 2132, 2132
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existing literature focuses on the procedural due process safeguards
guaranteed by the Constitution for students in public colleges and
universities, 155
 while the few articles that have examined procedural
due process in the private school context have focused exclusively on
academic misconduct. 156
 The arguments offered by thêse authors in
the public school context, nevertheless, provide useful analogies to
the difficult problems presented by private school disciplinary proce-
dures for student-on-student sexual misconduct. 157
 Although at first
glance these approaches seem ill-fitting, they actually offer useful in-
sights by analyzing two significant concepts: (1) the unique problems
presented in a private school setting; and (2) the due process safe-
guards constitutionally required of public schools.
Commentators have discussed a number of specific procedural
due process rights: several have argued that a student accused of mis-
conduct should be provided a right to counse1. 155
 Some have sup-
ported a right to cross-examine witnesses. 159
 Others have urged that
students should have a Fifth Amendment-styled right to remain silent
during a hearing. 15°
In their article Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair Process for the
University Student, Colurnbia University Law Professors Curtis and
Vivian Berger argue that a registered student has a legally protected
interest in his or her college education, and that the level of proce-
dural protection should 'not decrease because the student attends a
(1987); Douglas R Richmond, Students' Right to Counsel in University Disciplinary Proceedings,
15 J.C. & U.L. 289, 289 (1989); Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1241; Marc H. Shook, Student
Article, The Time is Now: Arguments for the Expansion of Rights for Private University Students in
Academic Disciplinary Hearings, 24 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV, 77, 77 (2000); Sinson, supra note
22, at 195; Swem, supra note 35, at 359; Charles Alan Wright, The Constitution on Campus, 22
VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1027 (1969).
155 See Blaskey, supra note 36, at 65; Golden, supra note 154, at 337; Groholski, supra
note 17, at 739; Picozzi, supra note 154, at 2132; Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1241; Swett',
supra note 35, at 359.
156 See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 289; Shook, supra note 154, at 77.
1" The commentators who focus on academic misconduct in private schools offer au
analytic framework for examining the problems unique to private educational institutions.
Those commentators focusing exclusively on misconduct in public schools provide a con-
ceptual structure grounded in the Constitution's Due Process Clause that forms the guide-
lines for a "fundamental fairness" argument in the private school context.
' 58 See Blaskey, supra note 36, at 82; Groholski, supra note 17, at 800; Richmond, supra
note 154, at 289.
159 See Baker, supra note 35, at 21; Swett, supra note 35, at 377.
160 See Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1276; Swern, supra note 35, at 377. The Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "No person shall ... be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend, V.
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private rather than a public school. 161 Although the Bergers focus
their analysis on academic wrong doing for example, plagiarism,
cheating and the falsification of transcripts and resumesmuch of
their discussion can also be applied to an analysis of non-academic
issues, such as those of student-on-student sexual misconduct. 162 The
Bergers argue that rather than attempting to ground a private school
student's right to procedural protection in an expanded view of "state
action," a more prudent method of analysis would be to employ con-
tract law. 165 According to the Bergers, contract law can provide a stu-
dent with as much due process as a public school student receives un-
der the Constitution—and in some instances even more.'" The
Bergers offer a comprehensive examination of the manner in which a
contractual relationship between a student and a private institution is
formed and maintained. 165 They also discuss the role of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the contract-based analysis
and the importance of the student's reasonable expectations. 166
According to the Bergers, the essence of the contractual relation-
ship between the student and the school is in their mutual under-
standings and reasonable expectations—the student expects to be
treated fairly and the school expects "good citizenship," including
compliance with the prescribed set of rules. 167 This is consistent with
the courts, which have imposed a "good faith" duty upon private
schools, meaning that, at a minimum, the schools must follow the
161 See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 291.
162 See id.
161 See id. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "No State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law? U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§1. Because publicly funded colleges and universities have been determined to be agents
of the state, their decisions qualify as "state action." See Goss, 419 U.S. at 73711.8; Dixon, 294
F.2d at 158. Several commentators have attempted to show that the disciplinary proceed-
ings of a private university involve a degree of state action sufficient to trigger the applica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, but the Supreme Court rejected
the application of the "state action" principle to colleges and universities in Rendell-Baker a.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830,846 (1982). See Note, An Overview: The Private University and Due Process,
supra note 22, at 796-803; Note, Private Government on the Campus Judicial Review of Univer-
sity Expulsions, supra note 35, at 1388-89; Sinson, supra note 22, at 215-17. For a thorough
examination of the "state action" theory, as applied to private schools, see Note, An Over-
view: The Private University and Due Process, supra note 22, at 795-803.
164 See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 291.
165 See id. at 292-93.
166 See id.
161 See id. at 318-319; cf. discussion supra Part IA- B. The Bergers argue that the stu-
dent's tuition payment supplies the consideration for his or her expectations. See Berger &
Berger, supra note 22, at 319.
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rules they have published.t 68 The Bergers argue that the educational
"contract" between the school and the student is essentially a contract
of adhesion, a "take-it-or-leave-it proposition" under which the only
alternative to complete adherence is outright rejection. 169 Conse-
quently, because the student and the school do not have equal bar-
gaining power, the Bergers argue that the school must treat the stu-
dent fairly, and they urge courts to carefully scrutinize contracts when
asked to review a discipline decision.'"
Using a number of cases from both the public and private school
realms, the Bergers conclude that in order for a school's disciplinary
procedure to be exercised "fairly" and in "good faith" it must satisfy
two tests."' First, they argue, a school must establish "just cause" by a
preponderance of the evidence, which suggests that the school carries
the burden of proving it is more likely than not that an offense has
occurred.'" Second, a school must create a process that gives students
accused of misconduct a fair opportunity to contest the charges,
which includes, in serious cases, a hearing before an impartial
panel.'"
Although the Bergers focus their analysis on the contractual na-
ture of the relationship between a student and a private school, other
commentators have examined the precise contours of due process
required in public school settings. 174 In his article Cross-Examination of
Witnesses in College Student Disciplinary Hearings: A New York Case Rekin-
'GB See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 331-32.
169 See id. at 322-24. As the Bergers point out, the typical college applicant experiences
neither bargain nor equality in the exchange with the school and few of the terms of the
agreement ("contract") with the school we negotiable. See id. at 322. These factors, com-
bined with the typical student's youth only heighten the bargaining inequality of the two
parties. See id. at 323. Consequently, the resulting arrangement, or contract, arises between
decidedly unequal parties, contains a set of written terms fashioned by the stronger party,
is formed without discussion of or attention to the mitten content, and is generally not
meant to be discussed. See id. at 324.
170 See id. at 328. The Bergers note that courts, ultimately, must decide whether the
terms or the contract are fair and reasonable in the circumstances. See id. Because the
school has a duty of public service in educating its students, because the contract is adhe-
simian!, and because the education which the contract promises is an important interest
for the student, the court must insist that reasonable terms be adhered to, that unreason-
able terms be stricken and that missing terms assuring a student's fair treatment be sup-
plied. See id.
171 See id. at 335.
172 See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 335.
173
 See id.
174 See Baker, supra note 35, at 11; Blaskey, supra note 36, at 65; Golden, supra note 154,
at 337; Grohotski, supra note 17, at 739; Picozzi, supra note 154, at 2132; Rosenthal, supra
note 35, at 1241; Swem, supra note 35, at 359.
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dies an Old Controversy, Thomas Baker compares and contrasts federal
court decisions in the wake of disciplinary suspensions by public uni-
versities that were challenged on the grounds that the schools de-
clined to afford the accused students an opportunity to cross-examine
adverse witnesses.'" Baker concentrates particularly on the impor-
tance of providing a student accused of misconduct the opportunity
to cross-examine adverse witnesses. 176 He also advocates preserving a
thorough and complete record of disciplinary hearings.'" Although
Baker focuses exclusively on disciplinary procedures in public schools,
his argument is equally applicable to private schools, as the proce-
dures he advocates would ensure "fundamental fairness" and would
therefore be more likely to protect private schools from challenges to
their disciplinary decisions.
In conducting his analysis, Baker focuses on Donohue v. Balter. 178
In 1997, in Donohue, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York held that the United States Constitution entitled
a student facing expulsion from a public school the right to cross-
examine his accuser at the disciplinary hearing. 179 Donohue, a male
student at State University of New York (SUNY)-Cobleskill, a public
university, was accused of raping, a female student on campus. 180 After
the University conducted a hearing at which both the female student
and Donohue testified, the hearing panel found him guilty of violat-
ing the student conduct code, and the university president suspended
him for two years. 181 Donohue filed suit in federal court alleging, inter
alia, that the University violated his rights by not permitting him to
cross-examine witnesses at the hearing. 182 The court, through Judge
Kahn, noted that the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses is not an
essential requirement of due process. 185 Judge Kahn, however, also
noted the dictum in a Second Circuit decisionim that cross-
examination might be necessary in contested expulsion hearings
175 See Baker, supra note 35, at 21.
1711 See id. at 22-24.
177 See id. at 25-28.
178 976 F. Supp. 136 (N.D.N.Y 1997).
I" See Baker, supra note 35, at 21.
180
	 id. at 18-19.
181 See id. at 19.
tee see id.
188 See id.
184 Blanton v. State Univ. of N.Y., 489 F.2(1 377, 385 (2d Cir. 1972) (quoting Charles
Alan Wright, The Constitution on Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1076 (1969)).
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when the outcome of the hearing hinged upon witness credibility.'"
The court found that in this case, "the disciplinary hearing became a
test of credibility of the [respondent's] testimony versus the testimony
of [the complainant]" and that the Constitution obliged SUNY
officials to afford Donohue some sort of opportunity to pose ques-
tions to his accuser before the University imposed a two-year suspen-
sion . 186
Baker uses this case as a springboard for his discussion of the
administrative dilemma that university officials face in resolving
charges based upon student-on-student sexual misconduct. 187 Baker
argues that sexual misconduct cases, in particular, cause university
administrators a number of problems.'" First, these cases ordinarily
involve disputed allegations and ultimately depend upon witness
credibility. 189
 This problem is magnified, Baker argues, by the fact that
in many instances third-party eyewitnesses are rare, consensual fore-
play typically precedes a date rape and, moreover, physical evidence of
assault is often not available.'" The second administrative problem
presented in these cases, Baker contends, is that the school must as-
sume the neutral role of referee because the interests of the student
complainant and the student accused directly conflict with one an-
other.'" This tension, Baker argues, presents colleges with no small
challenge in designing an effective complaint resolution process.'"
Finally, Baker argues that due to the highly personal nature of a rape
charge and the emotional toll it exacts on the victim, the procedural
safeguard that best protects the interests of the accused—namely,
cross-examination—is most likely to maximize the victim's ordeal.'"
Baker concludes that because the federal circuits are split on the issue
155 See Baker, supra note 35, at 21.
"6 See id. at 21. Judge Kahn clarified in a footnote that the Constitution did not entitle
Donohue to cross-examine the complainant directly. See id. at 22. Baker points out the
irony that the decision in Donohue, the first federal cross-examination ruling unfavorable to
a public university, involved a charge of date rape during a time period remarkable for
expansive developments in the rights of student victims in gender-based physical harass-
ment. See id. at 22.
187 See id. at 22-24.
169
 See id. at 21-22.
189
 See id.
190 See Baker, supra note 35, at 23. As noted above, even when such evidence is avail-
able, physical evidence of intercourse may not be dispositive of guilt if consent is at issue.
See id.
191 See id. at 22-23.
' 92 See id.
198
 See id. at 23.
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of what, if any, cross-examination hearing rights are due a student fac-
ing expulsion from a public university, the precise contours of a stu-
dent's procedural right to cross-examine his or her accuser have yet to
be clarified .'94
Baker next maintains that judges and schools must consider the
competing interests of the students involved in these cases and would
be well-served to develop a complete hearing record to protect them-
selves in the event of post-hearing appeals or litigation. 195 He offers a
number of suggestions for how such a record may be preserved and
concludes that audio tape recordings are both cost-effective and high
quality. 196 Finally, Baker argues that a college's administration must
begin its fact-finding duties well before the date of a disciplinary hear-
ing and should interview the parties, identify any third party witnesses
and collect statements in anticipation of a contested proceeding. 197
Most importantly, Baker contends that hearing board members
should strive to identify important factual disputes as the evidence is
submitted, remain neutral as the evidence is presented and deliberate
in good faith, resting their decisions solely on the evidence presented
at the hearing. 198 In conclusion, Baker notes that if the right to due
process means anything, it means that the outcome of the hearing
should not be predetermined and that hearing board members
should consider the possibility that an erroneous charge may have
been brought against the accused student.m Ultimately, however,
Baker does not suggest that colleges and universities adopt any or all
of these procedures and, in fact,' merely puts the cards out on the ta-
ble for consideration. Like Curtis and Vivian Berger, Baker advocates
that schools afford students accused of serious misconduct more pro-
cedural protection, thus better protecting themselves in the event of a
lawsuit.m On balance, commentators have been more willing to urge
schools to adopt greater procedural protections and have encouraged
194 See Baker, supra note 35, at 30-31. For example, in Donohue, the accused student was
may have been permitted to cross-examitte his accuser indirectly. See id. at 20. Baker sug-
gests that future courts could choose to distinguish Donohue on its facts (the length of the
suspension and lack of a hearing record) or take the decision one step further and man-
date direct cross-examination as a minimum constitutional right. See id. at 30.
195 See id. at 25-27.
1 " See id. at 25.
1 °7 See id. at 26.
199 See id. at 27.
199 See Baker, supra note 35, at 27.
299 See id. at 27-28.
682	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 42:653
reviewing courts to hold private schools to a higher standard of fun-
damental fairness."'
II. ANALYSIS
"The history of liberty,' Justice Frankfurter wrote, "has largely
been the history of observance of procedural safeguards," for without
procedural protection, substantive protections would be virtually use-
less 242 Private schools have an obligation to guarantee their students
charged with student-on-student sexual misconduct procedural safe-
guards that are most likely to ensure that disciplinary proceedings are
fair and will lead to a reliable determination of the issues."' Two cen-
tral principles shape the relationship between a student accused of
campus sexual misconduct and the private school that is charged with
investigating the claim and administering discipline if a violation is
found. First, as courts and commentators agree, a private school
should have broad discretion to prescribe the moral, ethical and aca-
demic standards that it students must observe. 204 Private schools
should have the additional power to create, administer and imple-
ment their own rules and procedures governing disciplinary proceed-
ings and determine appropriate penalties for rules violations."' This
broad authority certainly includes protecting other students from
sexual misconduct and sanctioning this misconduct when it occurs. 206
Sexual assault, if unchecked, severely undermines the institution's
central mission to educate its students, creates a climate of hostility,
and polarizes the campus community."7
"I See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 328; Seavey, supra note 48, at 1407; Wright,
supra note 154, at 1060.
202 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
2°3 Sce Wright, supra note 154, at 1060.
2°4 See Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238, 244 (D. Vt. 1994); Holert v.
Univ. of Chi., 751 F. Supp. 1294, 1301 (N.D. 111. 1990); Ahlum v. Adin'rs of the Tulane
Educ. Fund, 617 So. 2d 96, 98 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 735 N.E.2d
373, 381 (Mass. 2000); Coveney v. Pres. of Coll. of the Holy Cross, 445 N.E.2d 136, 139
(Mass. 1983); Schulman v. Franklin & Marshall Coll., 538 A.2d 49, 52 (Pa. Super Ct. 1988);
Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1245; Sinson, supra note 22, at 196-97; Swein, supra note 35, at
364-65.
205 See Fellheimer, 869 F. Supp. at 244; Holert, 751 F. Supp. at 1301; ANum, 617 So. 2d at
98; Selmer, 735 N.E.2d at 381.
2°6 See Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1247.
207 See id. at 1247. See also, Schulman, 538 A.2d at 52. Here, the court offered some in-
sight into the importance of safeguarding a school's ability to ensure the safety of its stu-
dent:
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Second, a student accused of sexual assault has an important in-
terest in his or her education that must be scrupulously protected by
schools. 208 A dismissal or expulsion from a college or university, the
"capital punishment" of campus disciplinary systems, can alter a stu-
dent's legal status and make admission to another school impossi-
ble.209 Specifically, when a student is expelled, he is often unable to
enroll in a different university because in order to transfer, he must
demonstrate to the new school that he left his former school in good
standing. 21 ° Because a university degree is generally required for em-
ployment in technologically sophisticated fields and for admission to
graduate and professional school, and because students with univer-
sity degrees often earn higher salaries than students who are not uni-
versity graduates, an erroneous expulsion may foreclose future eco-
nomic opportunities for that student. 211 Thus, the economic wound
inflicted by an expulsion could remain with the student for the rest of
life. 212 In addition, in some instances the wound can run deeper and
permanently damage the student's good name, reputation and integ-
rity. 213 In highly politicized, notorious cases, universities have publi-
In this case, particularly with the necessary concern on college campuses as to
student activities in the sexual area and with the widespread notoriety and
publicity relating to date-rape and the opportunity for students to take advan-
tage of one another, perhaps fostered by the proximity of students to each
other in the mixed dorm communities ... pit cannot be denied that college
officials Must protect the student body as well as assure that students charged
with wrong-doing obtain fair treatment.
See id.
208 The complainant in a student-on-student sexual misconduct case undoubtedly has
an interest that must be protected, but in these cases, school administrators are more likely
to align the school's interest with the victim's interest. This was not always the case. See
Bernstein, Years Later, Fordham Case Still Haunts Woman, supra note 31, at 1; Bernstein, Be-
hind Some Fraternity Walls, Brothers in Crime, supra note 31, at 1.
2" See Groholski, supra note 17, at 753-55 (citing Herman v. Univ. of S.C., 457 F.2d
902,903 (4th Cir. 1972); Note, Common Law Rights for Private University Students, supra note
22, at 129; Picozzi, supra note 154, at 2138-39.
210 See Groholski, supra note 17, at 742; Picozzi, supra note 154, at 2139.
211
	 Groholski, supra note 17, at 742; Picozzi, supra note 154, at 2139.
See Groholski, supra note 17, at 742; Picozzi, supra note 154, at 2139.
2" See Groholski, supra note 17, at 742; Picozzi, .supra note 154, at 2139. See also ROIPHE,
supra note 31, at 39-41. Roiphe details two instances in which a university student fabri-
cated a date rape. See id. at 39. In one case, the female student reported that she had filed
a complaint with the school administration (she had not), that a school official had told
her to "let bygones be bygones" (he had not) and that the male student she accused of the
rape complained to the administration. See id. at 39-40. As Roiphe correctly observes, the
accusation of rape is a serious one and the male student accused in this case was in a terri-
ble position in the community until the record was set straight. See id. at 41. "Accusations
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cized the apprehension of the offending student to placate the uni-
versity community, with little regard for the emotional distress to the
student or the irreparable harm to the student's reputation. 214
These seemingly disparate interests can nevertheless be recon-
ciled to protect both the school and the student accused of sexual
misconduct. Although the Constitution's Due Process Clause affords
no protection for a private university student challenging the school's
disciplinary procedures or decisions,215 a number of commentators
have argued that the level of procedural protection in disciplinary
proceedings should not fall because a student attends a private rather
than a public school. 216 This argument is persuasive: procedural due
process rights are consistent with the goals of collegiate life, at private
as well as public universities. 217 Procedural safeguards benefit the en-
tire school community by serving to legitimize the exercise of disci-
plinary authority, thereby fostering a sense of justice, fairness and
community on campus. 218 These values, in turn, create an effective
educational environment." 9 Perhaps more importantly, particularly in
emotionally charged cases like those involving student-on-student
sexual misconduct, the orderly procedures of requisite due process
can mitigate the school's impulse to impose rash penalties and can
provide the administrative body with a shield to fend off demands for
hasty retaliation. 220 It seems unthinkable that a private school would
even consider guaranteeing fewer rights for their students than the
of rape stick, and in the twisted justice of the grapevine no one is considered innocent
until proven guilty." Id. at 41.
214 See ROIPHE, supra note 31, at 41.
215 See Ahhern, 617 So. 2d at 98; Coveney, 445 N.E.2d at 140; Anderson, 1995 WL 813188,
at *3; Psi Upsilon of Phila. 591 A.2d at 758.
216 See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 291; Robert B. McKay, The Student as Private
Citizen, 45 DEM% U. L. REV. 558,560 (1968); Note, Common Law Rights for Private University
Students: Beyond the State Action Principle, supra note 22, at 123-24; Wright, supra note 154, at
1035-36.
217 See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 291; Robert B. McKay, The Student as Private
Citizen, 45 DENY. U. L. REv. 558,560 (1968); Note, Common Law Rights for Private University
Students: Beyond the State Action Principle, supra note 22, at 123-24; Wright, supra note 154, at
1035-36.
212 See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 291; McKay, supra, note 217, at 560; Note,
Common Law Rights for Private University Students: Beyond the State Action Principle, supra note
22, at 123-24; Wright, supra note 154, at 1035-36.
21° See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 291; McKay, supra note 217, at 560; Note,
Common Law Rights for Private University Students: Beyond the State Action Principle, supra note
22, at 123-24; Wright, supra note 154, at 1035-36.
22° See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 291; McKay, supra note 217, at 560; Note,
Common Law Rights for Private University Students: Beyond the State Action Principle, supra note
22, at 123-24; Wright, supra note 154, at 1035-36.
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minimum rights the Constitution exacts from public schools. 221 In-
deed, it would be a "cruel hoax on the integrity of the educational
process" for any private school to take refuge in the existing public-
private distinction to justify the promulgation of otherwise unsup-
portable disciplinary procedures.222 Because colleges and universities
perform an essential function in a democratic society and because
they have been given a position of esteem, trust and responsibility,
they must, in return, treat students fairly, with equal dignity, care and
concern. 223
ChangeS in disciplinary procedures will come only when initiated
by the schools themselves or compelled by the courts as legislative so-
lutions are not to be expected. 224 Consequently, both courts and
schools play a vital role in protecting the interests of a student ac-
cused of sexual misconduct.
For their part, courts asked to review a private school's discipli-
nary decision should be more willing to do so.225 They should employ
contract law principles as the doctrinal foundation of their review. 226
The current deferential approach of the courts, finding that a
school's disciplinary system is "fundamentally fair" if the school sub-
stantially complies with its own established procedures, is itiade-
quate. 227 In effect, it invites private schools to eliminate procedures to
avoid violating them. 228 Indeed, potential lawsuits have become a
sufficiently potent threat so that 'counsel advising private schools have
22' See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 291; McKay, supra note 217, at 560; Note,
Common Law Rights far Private University Students: Beyond the State Action Principle, supra note
22, at 123-24; Wright, supra note 154, at 1035-36. As Curtis and Vivian Berger observe,
li]f due process sets the minimum standard for public institutional fairness, the contrac-
tual (private) floor should sink no lower." Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 337.
222 See McKay, supra note 217, at 560.
223 See id.; Simon, supra note 22, at 196; see also EDWARD N. STONER, II, UNITED EDUCA-
TORS INSURANCE RISK RETENTION GROUP, INC., REVIEWING YouR DISCIPLINE POLICY: A
PROJECT WORTH THE INVESTMENT I, 7 (2000).
224 See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 300; Note, Common Law Rights for Private Uni-
versity Students: Beyond the State Action Principle, supra note 22, at 1390.
226 See KORS & SILVERGLATE, supra note 5, at 278. In fact, courts appear to be more will-
ing to conduct a review of a private school's expulsion of a student for misconduct. See id.
As Kors and Silverglate observe, if colleges and universities remain stubbornly immune
from notions of fairness that have long prevailed in other arenas, courts will be more likely
to intervene in the affairs of the academy. See id.
226 See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 291.
227 See KORS & SILVEROLATE, supra note 5, at 350; Lana A. Shavartsinan, Schaer v. Bran-
deis University: Justice and Fair Play in a Private University Disciplinary Proceeding, 45 FEB B. B.J.
6,7 (2001).
222 See KORS & SILVERGLATE, supra note 5, at 350; Shavartsman, supra note 227, at 6,7.
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cautioned them to protect themselves by avoiding descriptions of
highly specific procedural protections (that students might later claim
constituted contractual obligations). 229
 By eznployiiig a heightened
standard of scrutiny, however, and recognizing that the contract be-
tween the school and the student is essentially adhesionary, courts can
better ensure that the administration of discipline in private schools is
fundamentally fair.2" The importance of recognizing the adhesionary
nature of the contract cannot be overstated: courts should acknowl-
edge that these contracts are generally executed unilaterally, contain
boilerplate language and do not provide opportunity for meaningful
negotiation of any of the terms. 231 Moreover, courts should consider,
when interpreting the terms of the contract, the extreme inequality in
bargaining power and should construe ambiguities and unreasonable
terms against the drafting party—the school. 232 Conducting a review
of a school's disciplinary procedures would enable the courts to en-
sure that private schools are administering discipline in a fundamen-
tally fair manner. 233
Although the role played by the courts is essential to making cer-
tain that the discipline systems in private schools are "fundamentally
fair," the schools themselves, of course, have the primary responsibil-
ity for enacting disciplinary procedures that comport with basic fair-
ness. 234
 Student-on-student sexual misconduct cases are hard cases
and the procedures a school adopts must consider the competing in-
terests presented. 235 As a result of the evidentiary problems posed by
these cases, schools have a heightened duty to weigh the credibility of
both parties. 236 Disciplinary procedures designed to uncover the per-
tinent facts of a contested case will reduce the possibility of an erro-
neous finding and insulate the school against a potential lawsuit. 237
222 See KORS & SILVERGLATE, supra note 5, at 350; Shavartsman, supra note 227, at 7. See
also STONER, SUM note 223, at 11 (counseling schools to provide the bare minimum of
"process" to satisfy a judge in order to avoid long legal entanglements).
230See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 322-25.
"'See id.
ssaSee Schaer, 735 N.E.2d at 382 (Ireland, J., dissenting); Berger & Berger, supra note
22, at 322-25.
2"See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 322-25.
234See Baker, supra note 35, at 25-28; Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 337-51; Swell',
supra note 35, at 382; Wright, supra note 154, at 1060,1064.
2" See Baker, supra note 35, at 22-24; Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1246-48.
236 See Baker, supra note 35, at 26.
237 See id. See also Kam & SILVERGLATE, supra note 5, at 270-71 (observing that the ju-
risprudence of procedural due process is in large Ineastire concerned with identifying
those procedures effective in discovering the truth).
2001)	 Student Disciplinary Proceedings	 687
There are, however, a number of procedural protections a private
school can provide to guarantee that the touchstones of fairness and
reasonableness govern their disciplinary proceedings. 258
A. Right to Written Notice of the Charges and Evidence
After a complaint of student-on-student sexual misconduct has
been filed with school officials, and an initial investigation of the alle-
gations has determined that a disciplinary proceeding is in order, the
accused student must be given written notice of the charges. 239
Among the most basic procedural protections, this notice should ad-
vise the student of the charges against him as well as the nature of the
evidence. 20 The written statement should further include the
grounds which, if proven, would justify discipline, and the student
should not be subjected to punishment on the basis of some ground
other than that stated in the written charge. 241 The formal notice
should inform the student of the date, time and place of the discipli-
nary hearing and afford him or her sufficient time to prepare a de-
fense. 242 Finally, in the interest of fairness reliability, the school should
have an ongoing duty to disclose to the student any exculpatory evi-
dence.243
258 SeeA&Bv. C. Coll. & D., 863 F. Supp. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). In dictum, judge
Broderick recommended that in order to protect all of the interests at stake, and to mini-
mize the risk of judicial involvement, schools should make the most effective possible ef-
forts to implement procedures which will minimize the many risks inherent in sexual mis-
conduct cases. See id. at 158. Among the risks he noted were failing to exercise discipline
where harmful acts occur, encouraging or pursuing false or malicious charges, or permit-
ting investigations or internal adjudications to turn into abusive events. See id. at 159. See
grnerally STONER, supra note 223 (detailing a number of disciplinary procedures and poli-
cies to improve a school's discipline systems and drawing distinctions between criminal law
and school discipline).
238 See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 351; Picozzi, supra note 154, at 2156-57;
Sweet, supra note 35, at 369-70; Wright, supra note 154, at 1071-72.
248 See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 346, 351; Sweet, supra note 35, at 69-70;
Wright, supra note 154, at 1071-72.
241 See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 346, 351; Sweet, ,supra note 35, at 69-70;
Wright, supra note 154, at 1071-72; see also Fellheimer, 869 F. Supp. at 246-47 (finding that
the College's failure to "state the nature of the charges with sufficient particularity to per-
mit the accused party to meet the charges" as it had promised to do constituted a deviation
from procedure that was fundamentally unfair); Ahlum. 617 So. 2d at 99 (finding that Tu-
lane "took great pains" to inform the student of the charges against him which did not
result in an unreasoned or thoughtless disciplinary decision).
242 See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 346, 351; Swett', supra note 35, at 69-70;
Wright, supra note 154, at 1071-72.
245 See Picozzi, supra note 154, at 2157.
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B. Presumption of Innocence and Standard of Proof
To ensure fundamental fairness in the disciplinary proceedings,
the accused student should be entitled to a presumption of limo-
cence.244 More precisely, the school should bear the burden of pro-
duction of evidence to sustain the charges against the student. 245 Be-
yond the burden of proof, the school should have an established
standard of production and only discipline a student if there is, at a
minimum, substantial evidence to support the charges. 246 The
difficulty in student-on-student sexual misconduct cases has caused
some schools to go even farther and require that the charges be
proved by clear and convincing evidence. 247
C. Right to an Impartial Hearing
As one commentator accurately explained, "if the right to proce-
dural due process means anything, it stands for the principle that the
outcome of the hearing is not predetermined."248 There is little doubt
that the disciplinary hearing itself should be conducted with basic
fairness, but there is some doubt as to exactly what basic fairness
means.249
 First, it is wholly impractical in many schools to guarantee
that no one who has had prior contact with the accused student may
be involved in the adjudication of the case.250 It is not unreasonable,
however, to require members of the disciplinary board to exercise in-
dependent judgment or to recuse themselves if impartiality is impos-
sible.251 Second, fundamental fairness in cases as sensitive and as emo-
tionally charged as student-on-student sexual misconduct cases
requires that the disciplinary decision be based only upon the evi-
dence admitted at the hearing and the charges listed in the notice of
244 See Baker, supra note 35, at 27; Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 362; Groholski,
supra note 17, at 792; Picozzi, supra note 154, at 2151; Swent, supra note 35, at 379.
245 See Baker, supra note 35, at 27; Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 362; Groholski,
supra note 17, at 792; Picozzi, supra note 154, at 2151; Swent, supra note 35, at 379.
245 See Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622, 625 (10th Cir. 1975); Ahlurn,
617 So. 2d at 100-01; Anderson, 1995 WL 813188, at *4; Swent, supra note 35, at 379;
Wright, supra note 154, at 1073.
247
 See Selmer, 735 N.E.2d at 378; Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 362; Groholski, su-
pra note 17, at 792; Picozzi, supra note 154, at 2158; Swent, supra note 35, at 379-80.
245 Baker, supra note 35, at 27.
249 See Wright, supra note 154, at 1080.
290 See A & B, 863 F. Stipp. at 159; I !alert, 751 F. Supp. at 1301; Anderson, 1995 WL
813188, at *4; Psi Upsilon of Phila., 591 A.2d at 760-61; Swent, supra note 35, at 371-72;
Wright, supra note 154, at 1080-81.
251 See Swem, supra note 35, at 371-72; Wright, supra note 154, at 1080-81.
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hearing letter.252 To ensure strict adherence to this requirement,
training is essential: disciplinary board members should remain neu-
tral and should attempt to identify important factual issues in dispute
as evidence is presented. 255 Deliberations should be in good faith and
decisions should be based solely on the evidence presented at the
hearing.254 Finally, in the event of an acquittal, the accused student's
permanent record should be expunged of any reference to the mat-
ter.255
D. Right to a Transcript or Recording of the Proceeding and to an Appeal
Fundamental fairness in the disciplinary process requires a hear-
ing record that can be used by hearing board members during their
deliberations and in the event of an appea1. 256 A verbatim record, ei-
ther in the form of an audio tape or stenographic transcript enables
hearing board members to recall key portions of the testimony with-
out relying on frail human memory and, therefore, ensures that the
ultimate decision will be grounded on the evidence presented. 257 A
complete record also protects the school on appeal: the accused stu-
dent must be able to point to error or fundamental unfairness in the
record in order to take meaningful advantage of the right to ap-
pea1. 258 Finally, knowing that the proceedings are being recorded and
may become "public record" if the student appeals the disciplinary
decision, hearing board members may have a greater incentive to
strictly conform their behavior to established procedures. 259
252 See Baker, supra note 35, at 27-28; Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 363; Picozzi,
supra note 154, at 2145,2158.
255 See Baker, supra note 35, at 27.
254 See
255 Picozzi, supra note 154, at 2158.
256 See Schaer, 735 N.E.2d at 379-80; Ahlum, 617 So. 2d at 99; Baker, supra note 35, at
25-26; Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 344•45; Picozzi, supra note 154, at 2158; Swetn,
supra note 35, at 380. See also STONER, supra note 223 (recommending that schools make a
single verbatim audio tape recording of a disciplinary proceeding to aid hearing board
members in their deliberations and to he used in the event of an appeal). Baker offers a
number of excellent suggestions for the most effective use of audio tape including: (1)
using reliable equipment; (2) following strict mechanical protocol at the hearing; (3) em-
ploying an appropriate number of microphones and a recording level gauge; and (4) hav-
ing the hearing administrator interrupt the proceedings to identify each speaker. See
Baker, supra note 35, at 25-26.
257 See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 344-45. A convincing argument can be made
that an audiotape may produce a superior quality record because stenography cannot
capture voice inflections, emphasis or tone quality. See Baker, supra note 35, at 25.
256 See Berger V. Berger, supra note 22, at 344-45.
259 See Id.
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E. Right to Confront, Cross. Examine and Present Witnesses
Cross-examination is an essential feature of the process by which
truthful testimony is distinguished from falsehoods. 26° Although cross-
examination reduces thè risk of an erroneous expulsion, face-to-face
cross-examination of the victim by the accused also maximizes the vic-
tim's ordea1. 261
 In situations in which the fact of intercourse is not in
dispute and consent is the sole contested issue, the importance of
cross-examination is magnified. 262 These cases resolve themselves into
problems of credibility and the hearing board must choose to believe
either the accused student or the alleged victini. 266 A reliable deter-
mination of the issues is essential to a fundamentally fair process, but
in these highly personal and emotionally grueling cases, a school
must consider the toll that the proceeding exacts on the victim. 264
What can a school do in these situations? One possible solution is
to permit indirect cross-examination, in which the victim is shielded
from the accused student's view. 265 Another option is to allow the ac-
cused student to respond to the testimony of each witness after the
witness has testified.266 Another option is to allow the accused student
to offer evidence in defense, to suggest persons who might be inter-
viewed by the hearing board and to suggest questions that might be
put to these persons. 267
260 See KORS & SILVERGLATE, supra note 5, at 272; Baker, supra note 35, at 23-29; Berger
& Berger, supra note 22, at 363; Picozzi, supra note 154, at 2158; Swein, supra note 35, at
376-77; Wright, supra note 154, at 1076.
261 See KORS & SILVERGLATE, supra note 5, at 272; Baker, supra note 35, at 23-29; Berger
& Berger, supra note 22, at 363; Picozzi, supra note 154, at 2158; Swent, supra note 35, at
376-77; Wright, supra note 154, at 1076.
262 See KORS & SILVERGLATE, SUPra note 5, at 272; Baker, supra note 35, at 23-24; Berger
& Berger, supra note 22, at 363; Picozzi, supra note 154, at 2158; Swent, supra note 35, at
376-77; Wright, supra note 154, at 1076.
262 See Baker, supra note 35, at 24; Swein, supra note 35, at 376-77; Wright, supra note
154, at 1076.
264 See Baker, supra note 35, at 23; Swett', supra note 35, at 377.
262 See Cloud, 720 F.2d at 725.
266 See Baker, supra note 35, at 26.
267 See A Co' B, 863 F. Supp. at 159; Anderson, 1995 WL 813188, at *5; Berger & Berger,
supra note 22, at 352. The Bergers urge that the student's right to be heard should com-
prehend more than the mere privilege of speaking to the hearing board himself or herself
because witnesses with less obvious of a bias than that of the accused may be more persua-
sive. See id. at 352. They also may have relevant, even critical, knowledge not possessed by
the parties. See id.
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F. Right to Counsel
Colleges and universities fear that permitting an accused student
to be represented by counsel in a school disciplinary hearing will re-
sult in an adversarial judicial proceeding. 268 In reality, a case involving
student-on-student sexual misconduct is per se adversarial, and there
is simply too much at stake to deny an accused student the right to an
attorney.269 Further, in all likelihood the school has sought the advice
of counsel in preparation for the disciplinary bearing; thus, fairness
dictates that the student should enjoy that same right. 270 One compet-
ing consideration is that if lawyers enter the process, the system would
advantage only those students able both to find and afford an attor-
ney.2"
Even if the benefit cannot be shared equally, there are two other
reasons that a student accused of sexual misconduct should be enti-
tled to the assistance of counsel in a campus disciplinary hearing.
First, because an accused student's statements in a hearing may be
relevant to subsequent or concurrent criminal proceedings, accused
students should be entitled to representation by an attorney when
they face potential criminal charges arising out of the same set of facts
that led to the school's disciplinary charges.272 Otherwise, students in
this position face the proverbial Hobson's choice: they can meaning-
fully defend themselves in the disciplinary hearings, potentially in-
criminating themselves and certainly exposing the strengths and
weaknesses of the case to the criminal prosecutor, or—wanting most
of all to avoid going to prison—they can protect their criminal de-
fense by opting not to contest the school's charges, virtually ensuring
expulsion. 2" In the context of sexual misconduct cases, with consent
often the key issue and alcohol frequently a factor, piecing together
the pertinent details is imperative and the absence of any defense by
the accused is likely to lead to sanctions at the school leve1. 274 Here,
268 See Groholski, supra note 17, at 791; Richmond, supra note 154, at 290; Swem, supra
note 35, at 373.
26° See Groholski, supra note 17, at 795-97; Picozzi, supra note 154, at 2150.
27° See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 343; Groholski, supra note 17, at 780; Rich-
mond, sulna note 154, at 298-300; Swell', supra note 35, at 373; Wright, supra note 154, at
1076.
2" See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 340.
272 See Richmond, supra note 154, at 298, 300; Swell', supra note 35, at 373. •
275 Picozzi, supra note 154, at 2152-53; Richmond, supra note 154, at 300.
214 See Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1276-77.
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the stakes are enormous and basic fairness requires that the accused
student be permitted representation by counsel.
Second, faced with serious disciplinary consequences, including
expulsion, the accused student undoubtedly experiences an intense
emotional response. 276 School disciplinary hearings are intimidating;
as a result, the student may not be able to effectively articulate his or
her side of the story or version of the facts in a coherent and logical
tnanner. 276 With the potential of an erroneous expulsion, accused
students should not be forced to "go at it alone"—an attorney can
better articulate the student's position and protect his considerable
interests. 277
CONCLUSION
In his dissent in Schaer v. Brandeis, Justice Ireland cogently articu-
lated the difficulty faced by private schools that are confronted with
the competing interests inherent in student-on-student sexual mis-
conduct cases:
While the university's obligation to keep  members of its
community safe from sexual assault and other crimes is of
great importance, at the same time the university cannot tell
its students that certain procedures will be followed and then
fail to follow them. In a hearing on a serious disciplinary
matter there is simply too much at stake for an individual
student to countenance the university's failure to abide by
the rules it has itself articulated. 278
Without question it is imperative that private schools protect victims
of sexual misconduct, but this protection must not come at the ex-
pense of procedural safeguards designed to resolve credibility ques-
tions and lead to a reliable determination of the factual issues. Al-
though the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause is not
availing to a private school student, concerns for fundamental fairness
should not be sacrificed. Indeed, a good student disciplinary proce-
dure should go beyond the constitutional minimum to avoid arbi-
275 See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 341; Groholski, supra note 17, at 789.
276 See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 341; Groholski, supra note 17, at 789; Rosen-
thal, supra note 35, at 1276-77.
277 See Berger & Berger, supra note 22, at 341; Groholski, supra note 17, at 789; Rosen-
thal, supra note 35, at 1276-77.
278 Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 735 N.E.2d 373,383 (Mass. 2000) (Ireland, J., dissenting).
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trariness and to promote reasonable decisioninaking and bask fair-
ness.
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